I am a Security Engineer at AWS, with a Ph.D. in Computer Engineering from Virginia Tech. My foundational expertise lies in securing embedded systems, analyzing side channels, and designing defenses at the silicon and platform levels.
Lately, I’ve been exploring how those hardware trust anchors scale and integrate into larger cloud ecosystems—how attestation, key management, and system firmware interact in the broader service stack. My work aims to bridge the design gap between physical security and cloud trust boundaries, so that secure architecture can flow smoothly from silicon to service.
Specialties & Interests:This project shows how long-term-data remanence is a threat to Trusted Execution System such as ARM TrustZone.
Creating artificial data retention in on-chip SRAM cell. This is a cold-style attack on on-chip SRAM, but without any cooling effect needed
This project is designed to conceal information in the analog layer of static random access memories (SRAM) with plausible deniability. The idea is to burn data into the transistor so that it is reflected in the SRAM's power-on state. The hidden information coexists with the data in the digital layer. That is, the system shows no signs of hidden data anywhere.
Cloud service providers typically restrict access to low-level device information, such as device DNA. This project introduces an RTL design that utilizes the FPGA clock synthesizer to extract device behavior, enabling identification of specific FPGAs in the cloud. The system includes a hardware/software suite for seamless integration with AWS F1 instances, featuring necessary RTL and system service modules for signature extraction during the boot phase of the host CPU.